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Abstract
The term "perimeter defense" has come back into vogue recently, with regard to security strategies
for North America. The United States' concern primarily with the terrorist threat to its homeland
subsequent to September 11, 2001 (9/11) is generating this discussion with its immediate neighbors
of Mexico and Canada (and to some extent some Caribbean nations—the "third border"). The concept
is simply that by pushing defenses out to the "perimeter" nations, then security will be enhanced,
since the United States visions itself as more vulnerable to international terrorism than its neighbors.
However, Canada and Mexico have not been very happy about the perimeter defined by Washington
since 9/11. These nations have sought to define the trilateral relationship beyond just discussions of
terrorism to include natural disasters and international organized crime as a component of a broader
trilateral agenda. Eight years later these three nations continue to look for some convergence of
security interests, although there remains a degree of tension and hesitancy towards achieving a
"common security agenda" in the Western Hemisphere.This article examines the concept of
"perimeter defense" within the context of the new security challenges that the United States, Mexico,
and Canada face today. Questions to be addressed in the article include: Do all these nations share the
same "threat" perception? Where exactly is the "perimeter?" What security arrangements have been
tried in the past? What are the prospects for the future for increased security cooperation? The main
focus of this article is at the sub-regional level in North America and whether a new "trilateral"
strategic security relationship between the United States, Canada, and Mexico can emerge in North
America.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss1/651
Toward a New Trilateral Strategic 
Security Relationship: United 
States, Canada, and Mexico
By Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano, and
Todd S. Hataley
Introduction
The term "perimeter defense" has come back into vogue recently, with 
regard to security strategies for North America. The United States' 
concern primarily with the terrorist threat to its homeland subsequent to 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) is generating this discussion with its immediate 
neighbors of Mexico and Canada (and to some extent some Caribbean 
nations—the "third border"). The concept is simply that by pushing 
defenses out to the "perimeter" nations, then security will be enhanced, 
since the United States visions itself as more vulnerable to international 
terrorism than its neighbors. However, Canada and Mexico have not been 
very happy about the perimeter defined by Washington since 9/11. These 
nations have sought to define the trilateral relationship beyond just 
discussions of terrorism to include natural disasters and international 
organized crime as a component of a broader trilateral agenda. Eight 
years later these three nations continue to look for some convergence of 
security interests, although there remains a degree of tension and 
hesitancy towards achieving a "common security agenda" in the Western 
Hemisphere.
This article examines the concept of "perimeter defense" within the con-
text of the new security challenges that the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada face today. Questions to be addressed in the article include: Do all 
these nations share the same "threat" perception? Where exactly is the 
"perimeter?" What security arrangements have been tried in the past? 
What are the prospects for the future for increased security cooperation? 
The main focus of this article is at the sub-regional level in North America 
and whether a new "trilateral" strategic security relationship between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico can emerge in North America.
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The Post 9-11 Security Environment
Since 9/11, the United States has reshaped its security strategy and insti-
tutional structures in order to respond to the new threat of international 
terrorism, specifically targeted against U.S. interests at home and abroad. 
This fundamental shift in U.S. policy directly impacted its security rela-
tions with nations around the globe. While many nations echoed support 
for U.S. and coalition forces' action in Afghanistan, specifically targeted 
against the Taliban regime and known terrorist bases in that country, they 
did not weigh-in with U.S. efforts against Saddam Hussein and military 
action in Iraq. In fact, two nations in Latin America, Mexico and Chile—
both United Nations Security Council members at that time—formed a 
strategic coalition against U.S.-sponsored action in the United Nations 
and sought an international sanction for military action, because in the 
view of the Mexican Ambassador to the UN Security Council at that time, 
Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, "there was at stake our relations with the Arab 
world and the integrity of the international right at the United Nations."1 
Even Canada, a staunch Cold War ally, refused to support U.S. military 
action in Iraq, instead limiting its military support to the Global War on 
Terrorism to coalition actions in Afghanistan.
While the Canadian and Mexican Governments took public stands against 
the United States on Iraq, behind the scenes both countries were moving 
toward accommodating the United States' view of the threat of terrorism 
in the Northern Hemisphere (an example being the signing of the Smart 
Borders initiative with both countries in 2001–2002). On the military 
side, both Canada and Mexico began to take on new security relationships 
with their U.S. counterparts, even challenging some old taboos. For exam-
ple, after 9/11, the United States military stood up a new command to spe-
cifically support the Homeland Defense role of the military in support of 
Homeland Security.2 U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was 
carved out of the existing U.S. Space Command structure, located in Colo-
rado Springs, Colorado, which also housed the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD). Canada continued to provide personnel to 
NORAD even as the United States stood up the new NORTHCOM struc-
ture. Defense planners in the Pentagon were also considering overtures to 
Mexico, based on the new Unified Command Plan architecture that 
"placed" both Mexico and Canada under the operational area of responsi-
bility (AOR) overview of the NORTHCOM Commander.3
On the political side, there were also changes in Mexico with regard to 
their view toward security relations with the United States. Prior to 9/11, 
Mexico appeared to be moving in the direction of recommending that the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) and 
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the Inter-American Defense Board be revoked in their entirety since these 
structures lacked validity due to the fundamental change in the security 
relationships between nations in the hemisphere.4 However, after 9/11, 
then Mexican President Vicente Fox took the complete opposite position, 
citing the need for a second Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City in 
2003, to discuss hemispheric security issues. Although he was careful not 
to allude to the formation of any new formal military alliances and 
insisted that the real "threat" to the hemisphere was still poverty, for prac-
tical purposes, Fox was clearly falling more in line with U.S. interests and 
desires to expand the security relationship in the Northern Hemisphere. 
Yet Fox, and his Minister of Foreign Relations, Luis Ernesto Derbez, 
sought a much broader multidimensional approach on security delineat-
ing a sharp distinction with American military emphasis. This became 
more evident after the departure from the Fox administration of the Mex-
ican Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council, Aguilar Zínser, 
in November 2003, and the approval of a new law on national security in 
Mexico in January 2005. This new law reflected Mexico's focus on the 
threat of terrorism and drug trafficking, which was also addressed with 
the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership between the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico in Waco, Texas in March 2005.5
NORAD
After 9/11, Canada and the United States continued to make significant 
progress in the realignment of their bilateral security relationships. In 
December 2002, the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) was established, 
after exchanging formal diplomatic notes and terms of reference through 
diplomatic (Secretary of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) channels. 
The BPG sought to expand the current NORAD agreement to include 
maritime and land-based approaches to the Northern Hemisphere. Other 
topics addressed include enhanced intelligence and information sharing, 
inter-agency cooperation, better situational awareness, and border secu-
rity. The BPG completed their preliminary recommendations in 2005, 
and a renewed NORAD agreement, to include a maritime component, was 
signed in August 2006.6
For U.S. Northern Command and NORAD officials seeking to accomplish 
their assigned mission of providing for the Homeland Defense of the Con-
tinental United States and Canada, the prospect of expanding the "perim-
eter" of defense out beyond the borders of these two nations, to include 
Mexico, continues to be problematic. Overtures continue to be made to 
Mexican defense officials through low-level contacts, or through estab-
lished working relationships, such as the Fifth U.S. Army-sponsored Bor-
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der Commanders Conferences. The Mexican Navy has also placed a 
liaison officer at NORTHCOM Headquarters in Colorado Springs;7 how-
ever, the prospects of an expanded security relationship that would bring 
Mexico into either the current NORAD structure or the proposed 
expanded NORAD agreements is not likely to occur any time soon.8
NORTHCOM
On the U.S.- Mexico side of bilateral security cooperation, progress has 
been much slower. After Mexico's initial show of support for U.S. security 
concerns after 9/11, political reality set in, with a retrenchment of Mexi-
can nationalism and public concern over Mexico's involvement in any 
new formal military alliances. The Mexican press ran a number of articles 
condemning the formation of NORTHCOM in 2002 and the "assigning" 
of Mexico to its area of responsibility (AOR), arguing that Mexico would 
soon be "occupied" by the U.S. military on its side of the border.9 Penta-
gon planners exacerbated Mexican sensibilities and history after deliver-
ing a presentation of the new NORTHCOM emblem showing Mexico 
within its AOR; this emblem continues to pose an obstacle to deepening 
security collaboration with Mexico.
Mexico's Secretary of Defense at the time, General Clemente Vega Garcia, 
initially indicated a willingness to open channels of communication to 
this new command and not be constrained by past relationships in mili-
tary-to-military cooperation with the United States.10 However, in Mex-
ico, he was reluctant to publicly accept any such collaboration. For 
example, in October 2004, in his testimony before the Mexican Congress, 
General Vega argued that Mexico "will never be subordinated to the 
Northern Command even in its dreams."11 He was adamant that he would 
not work through a U.S. regional combatant commander, insisting that 
his relationship with the U.S. military would still be directly with the Sec-
retary of Defense (considered his equivalent cabinet-level officer) or the 
Chief of Staff of the Army.12
The strategic shift from ambivalence to cooperation on defense issues 
between the U.S. and Mexico has occurred as a result of the October 2007 
Merida Initiative, an agreement between the U.S. and Mexico which 
pledged $1.4 billion in U.S. aid to help Mexico and Central American 
nations in their fight against drug trafficking. In March 2009, NORTH-
COM Commander, General Gene Renuart, pointed out to the U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee the historic transformation between the 
NORTHCOM and the Mexican Armed Forces, "Over the past year, we 
have advanced our relationship from one of introductions and orientation 
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visits to one of open, frequent and frank discussions on how we can 
improve our collective security from common threats…We are now final-
izing the requirements for delivery of transport helicopters and maritime 
surveillance aircraft to the Mexican military under the Merida Initia-
tive."13 However, this "clarity" in mission toward the relationship with 
Mexico from the Northern Command perspective has not been resolved 
by the Mexican Government.
There were also additional political obstacles in furthering U.S.- Mexican 
strategic security cooperation. The State Department (still reeling over 
Mexico's failure to back the United States in the 2003 UN Security Coun-
cil to authorize force in Iraq) continued to play hardball with the Mexican 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The State Department also blocked the 
Department of Defense's desire to increase its Foreign Military Financing 
Program (FMFP) budget for Mexico to $57 million in FY05, reducing it to 
a meager $2.4 million. Mexico did receive $11 million in FMFP funds in 
FY06.14 Funding for FMFP dropped in FY07 and FY08, but picked up 
again in FY09 with a request for $2 million. The reason for this major 
shift in U.S. funding for Mexico occurred in FY08 with the Merida 
Initiative15 and $500 million now designated for counter-drug efforts, 
funded through the State Department, International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL).16
Defining the Threat and the Perimeter
The most successful security agreements have been those shaped by 
shared threat perceptions and the imminence of attack. The more distant 
the adversary, the less likely the "home team" is willing to play. Perimeter 
defense implies that the threat remains "out there" and there is a need to 
keep it from coming "in here." Clearly, the focus on homeland security 
and homeland defense in the War on Terrorism conveys this point of 
view. However, by taking an "all-hazards" approach to homeland security 
and including the threats from both man-made and natural disasters into 
the equation, the concept of perimeter defense takes on an internal 
dimension in addition to the traditional external focus. In other words, 
the threats that Canada, Mexico, and the United States collectively face, 
now and in the future, are of such significance to economic security and 
domestic policy considerations that the response to disasters (whether 
man-made or not) and other security threats (such as drug trafficking and 
transnational crime) must also serve to "contain" the damage and prevent 
the spillover effect beyond the "perimeter" of each country into that of 
their neighbors.
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If the United States, Canada, and Mexico are to form a new trilateral stra-
tegic security relationship in the North American Hemisphere, given the 
large number of impediments previously discussed, another approach 
may be necessary. It is worthwhile to re-address the security concerns of 
each nation, in the post September 11 world by re-examining the nature of 
the threat that each nation perceives and the context of "perimeter" with 
regard to the security concerns of each.
U.S. Threat Perception
For the United States, the threat of global terrorism, primarily from fun-
damentalist Islamic groups, is very high. The U.S. State Department cur-
rently lists 45 Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), of which 29 are 
Islamic groups.17 Some of these groups (Hizbollah, Hamas, etc.) are 
known to operate in Latin America, but other than Hizbollah's implica-
tion in an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992, they have 
not actively targeted Latin American or U.S. interests in the region, to 
include Canada.18 Some terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), have been identified as operating in Colombia with the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), possibly providing demoli-
tions training, but again, there is no evidence of any of these identified 
FTOs specifically targeting U.S. interests in the region.
Since the inauguration of President Barack Obama, the United States has 
focused less on the terrorist threat which could come through either Mex-
ico or Canada, and more on the threat of Mexico's war on its drug cartels 
which spilled over the border into the southwestern United States. In light 
of the emergency situation, the United States has refocused its efforts on 
countering the threat of drugs and related criminal violence. To their 
credit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama both 
acknowledged that Mexico's internal security problems due to drug vio-
lence were fueled by arms trafficking coming from the United States and 
that the U.S. shared in the responsibility to help stem the violence.19
Mexico Threat Perception
Certainly, for Mexico, the threat is not so much terrorism, but rather Mex-
ico's drug cartels, the nature of transnational organized crime, and the 
economic crisis. Mexican President Felipe Calderón realizes that Mexico 
faces increased instability due to the growing power of drug cartels and 
political violence if economic hardship were to escalate, and the "pressure 
value" of the U.S. border were to be closed off over U.S. fears of undocu-
mented immigrants and terrorists crossing the border. If the United 
States were to attempt to close the border, the impact on both nations' 
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economies would be enormous, primarily on Mexico, which has seen its 
trade with the United States grow exponentially in the last 14 years of 
NAFTA ($234 billion in exports in 2008).20 The economic impact on 
Mexico would also be staggering should the United States attempt to limit 
the amount of foreign remittances from illegal Mexicans working in the 
United States being sent back to Mexico (estimates of $25 billion annu-
ally, second only to oil, as Mexico's major export earning commodity).21
Viewed in this light, Mexico can't afford for there to be another terrorist 
attack on the United States, particularly if it appears that the terrorists 
used Mexico as the infiltration route. Thus, the drug trafficking issue, due 
to its transnational nature, is a shared concern which compromises the 
security of both the United States and Mexico. For Mexico, the United 
States needs to address domestic consumption and illicit gun sales. For 
the United States, Mexico needs to reform the judicial system, public 
security and the entire intelligence, defense, and national security struc-
ture. Blocking impunity and corruption is also valid concern for the 
United States. In the end, there is at least a consensus among the three 
countries on the transnational nature of organized crime and the negative 
impact for North America. Terrorism is not an equally-shared threat in 
the region; however, drug trafficking and the growing power and influ-
ence of complex transnational criminal organizations is a shared concern.
Canada Threat Perception
For Canada, the threat of a loss of sovereignty to the United States 
appears to be the greatest stumbling block to increased security coopera-
tion. Under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, Canada refused to support the 
United States and the war in Iraq. Under Prime Minister Paul Martin, 
Canada further refused to support the American National Missile Defense 
plan. Conservative Party Prime Minister Stephen Harper (elected in 
2006) has attempted to draw Canada closer to the United States on secu-
rity cooperation and undo some of the hostility encountered during the 
previous administrations, such as supporting Canada's involvement in the 
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). The SPP, signed in Waco, 
Texas, in 2005, is viewed skeptically by Canadians and Americans both, 
who believe it is a cover for ushering in a North American Union (NAU) 
under a shroud of secrecy.22 Ironically, Canadians view it as a loss of sov-
ereignty to the United States, while American citizens view it as a loss of 
sovereignty to Mexico.23
Kilroy, Jr. et al.: Toward a New Trilateral Strategic Security Relationship: United S
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010Journal of Strategic Security
58
Framework for Cooperation: Common Threats
Three areas that have witnessed an increase in security cooperation 
among the three countries involve natural disasters, pandemic influenza, 
and drug trafficking. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in September 
2005, both the Canadian and Mexican militaries sent uniformed person-
nel to the United States to aid in disaster relief. For Mexico, the sight of 
Army convoys, traveling north across the U.S.- Mexican border signaled a 
new era of security relations with the United States and a new role for the 
Mexican military, operating outside its borders.24 For Canada, it was a 
routine deployment, providing humanitarian assistance, this time to its 
southern neighbor.25
In May 2009, the H1N1 swine flu outbreak in Mexico threatened to 
become a pandemic, with cases spreading to the United States and around 
the world. Mexico moved quickly to control the disease by shutting down 
the country for up to three weeks, closing schools, restaurants and even 
suspending Cinco de Mayo celebration gatherings. Although some U.S. 
members of Congress called for a closing of the border, the Obama 
administration refrained from taking any extraordinary measures to halt 
travel or commerce between the countries. The sense of cooperation in 
the public health sector rapidly escalated as a priority for all three govern-
ments. In fact, they had already developed tri-national instruments to 
advance communication and the necessity of rapid coordination linked to 
the World Health Organization.26 For the United States, this was done 
through the Department of Homeland Security; in Mexico, the Ministry of 
Public Health; and in Canada, the Public Safety Office. This demonstrated 
the ability of all three governments to reach a level of cooperation and 
convergence toward a common threat.
The recent spike in drug-related violence along the U.S.- Mexican border 
has caused serious concern for the United States and Canada. In March 
2008, Mexico sent five thousand soldiers and federal judicial police to 
Ciudad Juárez, across from El Paso, Texas, to help the beleaguered 
municipal police combat the drug cartels and stem the homicide rate. 
Despite their presence, homicides reached a record 1600 deaths in the 
city by December 2008.27 Another five thousand troops were sent to Jua-
rez in March 2009, taking control of the city and all law enforcement and 
government operations in the city. On May 14, 2009, President Calderón 
visited Juárez, meeting with military and state and local government offi-
cials. Calling it the "epicenter" of Mexico's war on drugs, President Cal-
deron's decision to "militarize" the conflict in the state of Chihuahua has 
caused some Mexican Government officials to worry about the strategy, 
warning that if they do not succeed in controlling the violence in Juárez, 
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then other cities and states throughout the country will fail as well.28 Can-
ada has also experienced a spillover effect on its border with the United 
States when there has been increased attention placed on the U.S. south-
ern border or Caribbean trafficking routes. It is extremely likely that Mex-
ican drug trafficking organizations are expanding their operations in 
Canada today, where they see the U.S.- Canadian border as more porous 
and easier to penetrate.29 
The Road Ahead: August 2009 North American 
Leaders Summit
In August 2009, Guadalajara, Mexico, hosted a North American Leaders 
Summit attended by Barack Obama, Felipe Calderon, and Stephen 
Harper. The two-day event focused on the swine flu (H1N1 Virus) pan-
demic, economic and trade issues, transnational criminal activity, and 
global warming.30 Although the leaders did not specifically address the 
need for a new strategic security relationship, perimeter defense and 
regional security cooperation will remain a key component of the trilat-
eral relationship between Canada, Mexico, and the United States for 
many years to come. A catastrophic terrorist incident at the border, pan-
demic flu, the rise of powerful drug trafficking cartels, or even a major 
natural disaster are not isolated events which impact only one nation. 
They pose a series of challenges to the region as a whole and recognition 
that the growing interdependence, which is still primarily economic, has 
created a security dimension of its own, whereby a threat to any one of the 
three countries has to be considered a threat to all three. The challenge 
this new reality poses is key to developing a trilateral strategic security 
relationship, one that is yet cognizant of the relative power of each nation 
within the international system. The weight and dimension of each nation 
and their particular views on national security concerns are still very dif-
ferent, which makes security cooperation a complex task, although a 
much needed one for the future of North America.
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